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Abstract
China does not auction radio spectrum for wireless service 
but uses operations license granted by the government. 
The paper takes on LTE license to show how a flawed 
policy impairs adoption of LTE technology in China and 
how excessive interference hurts telecom operators.
LTE has two flavors: TDD and FDD. The Chinese 
government favors TD-LTE, a “minority” technology, 
to rescue struggling China Mobile from its failing 3G 
service, and to make China a leader in LTE. China does 
this by suppressing LTE FDD and China Mobile’s rivals 
China Unicom and China Telecom that prefer LTE 
FDD. As the paper argues, the bad policy has turned a 
business decision to a politically charged issue that brings 
harm to LTE development. The high price China has to 
pay: delayed LTE deployment, eliminated competition, 
discontent public and a laggard behind many countries in 
a tight race.
The paper then traces the root of the bad policy, what 
can happen when technology is viewed with political 
bias, how extraneous factors influence directions of 
technology without challenge, and what China can 
learn from the mistake and prevent it from impairing a 
promising technology.
Key words: LTE; TD-LTE; LTE FDD; Business 
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INTRODUCTION
LTE (Long-Term Evolution, 4G in layman’s term) is 
a new-generation wireless broadband technology that 
delivers higher data speed for user access to bandwidth-
intensive content such as streaming videos, interactive 
games and large file downloads. LTE has also spawned a 
new line of smartphones (such as iPhone) that delivers on 
demand for high bandwidth and improves user experience.
Like any wireless technology, LTE requires radio 
spectrum to transmit signals from operator’s RANs (radio 
access networks) to end users and back. In most countries, 
radio spectrum is treated as a natural resource with limited 
supply like water, electricity and oil, so the principle of 
“survival of the fittest” is adopted by allowing qualified 
operators to bid for radio spectrum (grouped in blocks) in 
exchange for the right to provide public service.
Since radio spectrum is scarce and whoever has it 
can make tremendous profit from public service, why 
the government does not want to sell radio spectrum as 
a source of state income but give it for free? Or asked 
in another way, can China auction radio spectrum like 
most countries?
The answer is no, because doing it could trigger a 
crisis in legitimacy of government ownership. In China, 
all operators are controlled by the government through 
management and financials. If they spend heavily on 
spectrum auction, in theory it is money lost on the 
government in the form of revenue and tax. Because of 
this, if China were to auction radio spectrum, it would 
mean the government spends its own money to buy its 
own asset! Clearly auction is not viable in China unless 
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fundamental changes take place in the very basis of 
telecom regulation. 
China sees radio spectrum as a state asset in addition 
to its natural attributes (Post & Telecom News, 2006; 
MIIT, 2009, 2010), therefore, China takes a different 
approach to allocation through a licensing policy which 
does not involve any monetary transactions.1 A license, 
among other things, specifies the type of service and 
which spectrum blocks (usually in pairs) are assigned for 
the service. In general, a licensing process begins when 
operators submit a proposal to the government which state 
what type f service they intend to provide and what kind 
of spectrum is required.
A license grants more power to the government in 
the deliberation and approval process, and leaves little 
bargaining room to operators. Compared to auctions, 
licensing is fast, simple, and a convenient means for 
regulators, it sets forth strict rules on what operator can 
and cannot do. If an operator is found of violating the 
licensing agreement, its license may be revoked and it will 
lose the right to providing the service.
An operation license can enables the government 
to: a) expedite adoption of a new technology through 
network construction and launching new service (license 
usually entails launch time as a requirement); b) delay 
or terminate a process the government deems premature 
regardless of the virtue of technology and/or market 
demand; and c) provide directions by suppressing certain 
aspects of technology or applications in favor of others. 
Clearly, all these are at the discretion of the government 
and it can change at anytime, despite criticisms that the 
power can be abused and turned against the market. The 
Ministry of Industry and Information technology (MIIT) 
is the mighty agency that regulates the telecom industry 
and is the authority for granting license (MIIT, 2001).
When a technology collides with policy as in the case of 
LTE, the latter often wins by way of licensing, but it is not 
mercenarily beneficial for the market. As discussed in this 
paper, a flawed policy can seriously stymie advancement in 
technology and a country’s ability to compete on a global 
scale, a high price China has to pay in the race of LTE, and 
the impact will continue for many years.
1.  THE STORY
China Mobile, the country’s largest wireless operator, 
began to work on LTE soon after the launch of 3G 
service based on TD-SCDMA platform in 2008 (Feng & 
Huang, 2009). The timing was odd because China Mobile 
had just spent RMB130 billion (US$21 billion) to build 
massive 3G networks, the real reason was because TD-
SCDMA, which was developed mainly in China (and 
only country that adopted the standard), was inferior to 
1 Although the license is free, operators still need to pay a nominal 
fee for right to use allotted spectrum blocks on an annual basis.
competing technologies like WCDMA and CDMA2000 
EV-DO. Customers of TD-SCDMA complained about 
slow speed, dropped calls, poor coverage and handset 
supply. Worse still, many TD-SCDMA subscribers found 
themselves were using GSM (2G) most of time because 
3G coverage was sparse (Dai, 2010). Weakness in 
technology and bad user experience forced China Mobile 
to find a way to salvage hefty investment and restore its 
reputation against competition.
Under tremendous pressure, China Mobile began 
testing LTE in late 2010 with plans to replace the ill-fated 
TD-SCDMA. Specifically, China Mobile turned to LTE 
TDD (commercial name TD-LTE). Discussion of LTE 
technology is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is 
important to point out the main reason for choosing TD-
LTE as 4G service is because it employs the same time-
division transmission technique as TD-SCDMA, so that 
in theory, TD-LTE improves spectrum efficiency and is 
more adaptive to the pattern of mobile data traffic (Yang, 
2011). Because of this common attribute, TD-LTE is 
chosen to be the optimal evolution path for TD-SCDMA 
with the benefit of less capital expenditure and network 
construction time (Jiang, 2011).
The downside of TD-LTE is that it is a less popular 
choice by most countries, so China Mobile may have 
faced the same quandary as it did in 3G, but the operator 
was compelled to make the plunge on TD-LTE and save 
itself from the 3G doldrums. The good news is TD-
LTE did win wide support from network equipment 
manufacturers and handset/chipset makers so that handset 
supply would be less of a headache when commercial 
service began, a bad experience China Mobile had during 
3G rollout (Guan, 2008; VoIPChina, 2009).
TD-LTE also received endorsement from MIIT with 
the belief that 1) China will be a leader in TD-LTE if 
more countries decide on TD-LTE and make it a popular 
standard in the world, and 2) it would save face of a state-
owned company from the 3G debacle and put it back in 
the lead (C114, 2009). (MIIT has never admitted to its 
responsibility for largely doomed TD-SCDMA.) 
And the timing looked good. LTE deployment was 
accelerating in North America and Asia, in which about 
10% of LTE networks (commercial and trial) were using 
TD-LTE (Lie, 2013; ICCSZ, 2014). At home, China 
Mobile began TD-LTE trials in 2011 in selected cities 
that eventually upgraded to commercial grade (Chen, 
2012). By now it was clear that TD-LTE would be the 
4G platform for China Mobile and it would be the largest 
such platform in the world.
But MIIT felt the technology was not ready for 
commercial rollout and advised China Mobile to invest more 
time in what’s called “N x N” paired tests including handset-
to-BTS, software and chipsets made by different vendors 
and used in different handsets (TD-LTE Working Group, 
2011). It may sound like a good reason, but anyone in the 
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technology knows that there is no such a thing as “mature” or 
“perfect” technology but a continual process of improvement 
and innovation, even after commercial service.
We never know if MIIT was aware of this or there was 
some other reason that prompted the decision to delay 
LTE licensing. After extensive trials, China Mobile was 
very confident about commercial launch and the public 
was anxious to experience the new service, MIIT was the 
only one stuck in the middle for at least another year (Su, 
2011). When facing a government that is powerful and 
unyielding, technology suffers a setback and the country 
loses the best chance in a tight race like LTE where every 
country is trying to implement the technology that can 
benefit the entire telecom industry and the economy in 
general, according to an MIIT official, one RMB in LTE 
investment can generate 5.6 RMB in the economy, 1.2 
times of that by 3G (Liu, 2014). The reality is China had 
to take a backseat while watching others passing by. And 
no one voiced criticisms of the policy.
Finally in December 2013, MIIT made a small step 
by issuing LTE license to all three operators, but it was 
only for TD-LTE not LTE FDD (People, 2013). Clearly it 
was designed to help China Mobile since China Unicom 
and China Telecom wanted to use LTE FDD (Lian, 2013; 
ChinaIRN, 2013). To them, a license for TD-LTE was a 
rejection to their decision; it is useless but made them a 
perfect scapegoat. In fact, the message from the license 
was to force China Unicom and China Telecom to develop 
TD-LTE as a condition for getting a license for LTE FDD 
later. If they should refuse, they could get punished by 
fulfilling other imposed conditions or keeping out of LTE 
market for longer than expected.
China Mobile was the sole beneficiary of the LTE license 
which not only granted it the right to LTE service, but also 
cleared its competitors out of the way. The licensing policy 
discriminated LTE technology simply because it did not fit a 
hidden agenda, and China Unicom and China Telecom had 
to bear the casualties: the license effectively pushed back 
the technology of their choice and preempted their ability to 
compete with a good chance to win.
In a less perfect regulatory environment, operators 
have little recourse on their hands but accept defeat. And 
the result is staggering. In just six months (from January 
to June 2014), LTE customers reached 13.97 million, 
of which 99.8% went to China Mobile. As the Figure 
shows, LTE was the main driver for user growth at China 
Mobile while its overall growth (2G and 3G to a lesser 
extent) waned.2 By comparison, the LTE’s unilateral gain 
at China Mobile was largely made at the loss of its rivals: 
by June 2014, China Unicom reported revenue growth 
plummeted to 3% from nearly 19% a year ago, and 
profit wiped out by more than half. Its user growth also 
plunged in February and April, but managed to bounce 
up in May and June (see Figure 1). The worst performer 
is China Telecom which lost nearly 5.4 million cellphone 
customers during first six months of the year. The tow 
operators blame the policy for favoring TD-LTE that 
caused disappointing performance and called on MIIT to 
amend its policy by expediting LTE FDD license (Liu, 
2014; Liu, 2014).
2 In its mid-year report (June 2014), China Mobile revenue grew 
7.1% and profit fell 8.5%. a continuous decrease for four  quarters in 
a row. It should be noted that decline in revenue growth and profit is 
also seen at other operators due to several reasons including a high 
cellphone penetration rate and rate cuts. Financial performance of 
telecom operators is beyond the scope of this paper.
Figure 1
Change of Cellphone Users at Three wireless Operators (from January to June 2014)
Notes. 1) No LTE subscriber data for January. 2) When LTE growth supersedes total subscriber growth at China Mobile, it indicates lost customers in 
GSM. 3) China Unicom and China Telecom also made customers for TD-LTE, but the number is negligible and most dangle users (no smartphone).
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2.  THE REMEDY
The full impact of a shortsighted policy on LTE 
development may never be fully understood. China 
started exploring LTE (especially TD-LTE) about the 
same time as many other countries; however, progress 
was slow as the country drew itself into frivolous debates 
on things like if the technology was ready or if China 
was ready, conceived risks, and how TD-LTE could 
promote patriotism and how it could help China rise 
to a world leader. Truth is, while TD-LTE received so 
much adulation as a “bless-China” technology, China 
was not the inventor; it’s not even a major patent holder 
(Wang, 2011; ZOL, 2013), but somehow the country was 
genuinely reveled at the self-fulfilling prophecy while 
the rest of the world was passing by fast, especially its 
neighbors South Korea, Japan, and even Hong Kong.
Soon the flaws of TD-LTE license began to surface as 
it eliminated competition that could have propelled LTE 
at a faster pace; worse, if the policy should continue, the 
damage for the other operators may not be retrievable 
which would bring more harm to LTE development than 
benefit for the country.
So in late June of 2014, MIIT did an about-face 
by issuing two LTE FDD licenses to China Unicom 
and China Telecom (no China Mobile). The reason, 
according to the agency, was it felt LTE FDD was ready 
for commercial service (Kang, 2014). The real reason, 
however, was two-fold. First, MIIT believed TD-LTE 
was on strong footing from a rival standard and China 
Mobile had stepped out of shadow of TD-SCDMA and in 
a better position for growth. A few months of protection 
had created a comfortable distance from its competitors. 
Second, without LTE FDD, China may never become a 
powerful voice in face of most countries where TD-LTE 
remains less popular.
There is a restriction in LTE FDD license. China 
Unicom and China Telecom are only allowed to conduct 
trials (defined as pre-commercial phase) of “hybrid” LTE 
networks, i.e., LTE TDD/FDD. China Unicom and China 
Telecom did not volunteer to enter the hybrid territory; it 
is imposed on them without their consent. MIIT officials 
insisted that hybrid LTE was the future and China could 
benefit by taking an early position. In theory, a hybrid 
LTE network is intriguing because it allows roaming 
between LTE TDD and FDD networks without drop-
offs or interruption of service; in practice, however, a 
hybrid is more of a fantasy than a viable solution. Most of 
all, it requires complicated configurations in RANs and 
operations, costs more (but not necessarily higher returns) 
and may not significantly improve user experience.
In addition to complexity in network design and 
operations, the notion of hybrid LTE network seems to 
be more like a whim than a real solution. First, a hybrid 
network may not generate significantly higher traffic than 
a standalone network because a) most LTE customers 
will unlikely buy a handset that’s TDD/FDD compatible 
because it will cost more and could compromise 
performance such as responsiveness, processing speed, 
image rendering and power consumption; b) even for 
roaming, most users will prefer to go in and out of a 
network that employs the same technology such as 
TD-LTE or LTE FDD, but not both to avoid confusion 
and performance deterioration. In case coverage is not 
available in an area, the handset can automatically search 
for a lower-grade network such as 3G or GSM, but less 
likely for another LTE network. Although performance 
may suffer when the handset is switched to a lower grade 
such as lower date rate and time delay, it at least keeps 
communication uninterrupted.
It should be noted that China is not alone on hybrid LTE 
network as the notion is being explored in some countries, 
according to GSA (Global Mobile Suppliers Association), 
an international trade group, 39 operators that had launched 
TD-LTE service, 13 had built hybrid networks in various 
configurations (Middleton, 2014). However, most of these 
networks are small in size and located in countries where 
available radio spectrum is scarce.
The new license also limits LTE construction to 
only 16 cities (no geographic restriction for TD-LTE) 
(Tech2IPO, 2014), which means a license will be needed 
from MIIT if China Unicom and China Telecom want 
to build a national LTE network, which is subject to 
the “progress” of trials, according to MIIT. The policy, 
regardless of its makers’ intentions, proves it wants to 
go all lengths to impede or delay a technology that could 
benefit the operators, the public and competition.
One may wonder how the bureaucrats at MIIT came 
up with such an idea that is self-destructive.  What is the 
purpose of doing this?
MIIT had no grudge against LTE FDD if TD-LTE 
was not ascribed to a politically charged issue and China 
Mobile assumed the role to carry it out. As a regulator, 
its task is not only to make LTE succeed but also to find 
additional significance. Since TD-LTE has been chosen 
for the ponderous purpose, LTE FDD must stay aside.
In fact, the logic behind the second LTE license is the 
same as the first license: TD-LTE needs more support 
from the government because it is a “minority” technology 
but bears great promise. If TD-LTE does succeed in 
China, there is a better chance it will for the world. What’s 
missing in MIIT’s line of thought is what the market has 
made where TD-LTE is in the world today, i.e., a minority 
technology. It is the choice by the market and a license 
can hardly change it, even in China.
We have to wait to see the impact of the restricted 
license on China Unicom and China Telecom, as well 
as on the overall LTE development, neither do we know 
when MIIT thinks time is ripe to allow full-fledged LTE 
FDD networks to be built. A licensing policy is absolutely 
necessary in China, but the government has picked 
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the wrong reason and bad execution which has caused 
irretrievable damage to LTE, both in dollar value and 
China’s best chance in technology.
3.  THE ANALYSIS
China ascribes strong emotions to TD-LTE because it is 
considered a “Chinese” technology. This is not true; China 
did not invent TD-LTE but one of the few countries that 
have adopted it. The decision by China Mobile to use TD-
LTE is because it provides the best migration for its ill-
fated TD-SCDMA. Plain and simple. However, a regular 
business decision was later blown up to China’s mission 
for the world. The other puzzle is why MIIT was willing 
to go all the way to promote TD-LTE even at the cost of 
blocking other LTE alternatives and financial losses. This 
is way beyond the purpose of a license. It is stupidity.
Perhaps the answer can be found from outside of 
technology.
First, a little history. During most of the 20th century, 
China was a laggard in technology which remains to be a 
sore spot for a proud country that boasts an ancient history 
filled with innovations and craftsmanship. For several 
hundred years, China was embroiled in endless wars and 
economic hardship that dragged the country into poverty 
and drove it further away from the ranks of technology 
and innovation.
It is a long-held desire that China could someday reclaim 
its glorious past and become a world leader in technology. 
It’s a painful recognition that without advancement in 
technology, China would always be a follower and a subject 
of exploitation. Right or wrong, a long history of agony 
and a strong will have formed the mindset of contemporary 
government and the orientation of policymaking. The early 
success of economic reforms in the 1980s reinforced the 
conviction which was repeated for the next two decades to 
create what’s known as “China Miracle”.
But the economic prosperity was mostly stemmed 
from manufacturing that mainly used low-cost materials 
and labor. The road to a world leader in technology is 
long and requires knowledge and innovation. And the gap 
with advanced countries is huge, so for many years China 
tries to circumvent the convention by using less time 
and effort, for example, a common approach is to copy 
the basic technology from somebody but add improved 
design and more features. In a way, the strategy has 
worked especially in consumer electronics and cellphone 
handsets, but that’s far and away from the coveted title of 
a technology giant.
As the cycle of telecom technology has accelerated, 
China sees the opportunity in standard. A technical 
standard, if endorsed by an international body and 
adopted by other countries, can become the fastest way to 
leadership in a given field.
Since TD-LTE shares similar modulation scheme and 
transmission as TD-SCDMA, China has made it a natural 
continuum and run a national campaign to claim its 
leadership in TD-LTE. China founded GTI (Global TD-
LTE Initiative) in 2011, a multi-operator consortium to 
promote TD-LTE and rally support for TD-LTE ecosystem 
(China Mobile, 2011). In recent years, however, China 
seems to have lost its influence at GTI because of slow 
progress in TD-LTE.
Telecom is a regulated industry because it is prone 
to natural monopoly in the name of economic efficiency 
and public good. Therefore, the public needs government 
oversight to prevent operators from abusing their 
positions. For this to work, many countries have adopted 
a proactive policy framework to encourage technology 
while restricting operators from making excessive profit, 
one way is to create a competitive environment.
This fundamental principle is not always followed 
through in China. In addition to an overbearing 
government, lack of pro-competition conditions and 
enforcement, there is one other explanation that has 
been largely neglected. Although telecom operators and 
regulators do not always see things eye-to-eye, they 
both work for the government and are obligated to serve 
government agenda often in the name of national interest. 
This underlying principle leads to a passive telecom 
policy rather than proactive; for example, a policy is often 
created to prevent undesirable things from happening, to 
maintain balance between technology and competition, 
and, in many cases in China, to offer favorable treatments 
for an underdog or curb the other if disparity worsens.
With this analysis, a license clearly has more to do 
with a government agenda and maintain “market order” 
than encourage new technology and promote growth. 
China Mobile is not necessarily a trusted ally of MIIT, but 
on the issue of TD-LTE, the two have come to a common 
ground to save a doomed 3G service, to protect a large 
state asset and to create a world leader in LTE.
This heavy baggage has cost China dearly. A promising 
LTE technology (LTE FDD) was shut out of competition 
albeit a better option which could have made China leap 
forward and become the largest LTE market in the world. 
Instead, it was chained to the ground until the government 
made sure TD-LTE was far ahead so that LTE FDD would 
always be a runner-up. As we know now, the policy has 
unwittingly thwarted the country’s ambition and lost the 
best window of opportunity to become a true leader in LTE.
4.  THE MORALS
The clamor over LTE license may have subsided, but its 
impact on LTE development in China will be felt in many 
years to come. Here are some of the lessons we have learned.
(a) Why do we need license for the telecom industry? 
It is because natural monopoly could wreak tremendous 
harm to the public good. Therefore, the main objective 
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of licensing policy is to create a fair environment for 
technologies and services that contribute to the objective. 
It is an onerous responsibility so regulators must exercise 
great caution not to create a monster that may undo the 
good intention of the policy and cause damage in the 
market. Sometimes it is possible to design a policy to 
promote a less popular technology, but the government 
must make sure it follows the same principle and the 
technology will help innovation, benefit the public and 
business growth. For this to happen, policymakers need to 
think hard about the following questions: What objectives 
do we want to accomplish? And what consequences it 
could leave in next year or next decade?
(b) As we have learned from LTE in China, a license 
can become a double-edged sword: it can accelerate 
adoption of a new technology and spur growth, but it also 
can stymie innovation and free market spirit.
The Chinese regulators are still learning how to respect 
market and design a policy framework that will not 
create conflict to market balance and disrupt momentum. 
They also need to learn how to strike a balance between 
right regulation and infringement of normal business 
operations, so that both sides win. This is still a novel 
concept in China as regulation often swings from laissez 
faire to excessive interference. Change can take a long 
time when the old doctrine of complete control has its 
deep root in regulators.
(c) When a bad policy is carried out, it invariably 
creates a “chilling effect” as companies feel being 
targeted if they do not follow orders; as a result, they 
are forced to change plans to be politically correct or to 
make regulators look good. As we have witnessed in the 
LTE licensing process, there was a lack of channels for 
operators to raise their concerns; even if there were, their 
voice may have met a deaf ear because the atmosphere 
is not conducive to candid discussion and objection. The 
“chilling effect” is like a disease: it bogs down growth, 
eliminates competition and destroys public trust.
There is nothing mystic about a license. If it is given 
too much weight other than a permit for technology and 
operations, it would lose its very purpose and we must 
ask ourselves why we want to use it in the first place. A 
bad licensing policy can also lead to illicit behaviors such 
as abuse of market positions, unfair competition, price 
fixing, and corruption.
(d) Since the 1990s, China has made great strides in 
economic reforms including a Western style regulatory 
environment such as separation of government function 
and business as a way to avoid conflict of interest (Liu, 
2001; Baike, 2014). But good intentions sometimes 
go awry by creating isolation between regulators and 
businesses as the former are less willing to listen to 
businesses of their needs and discontent, let alone to 
help business grow not to put shackles on their ankles. In 
theory, both regulators and corporations share a common 
goal that should make the best synergy. Unfortunately, in 
reality, many policies serve as the “sword of Damocles” 
that makes companies fearful. In word, the regulators 
encourage operators to run faster, but when they do, they 
will face a set of policies designed to cut their hamstrings.
(e) When there is a conflict in technology, sign of a bad 
policy is it quickly take sides based on a preset of criteria 
and punish the other. The lack of rigorous due diligence 
and balance can cause irretrievable damage and miss 
the best choice for the public. It is possible a “minority” 
technology ends up being a winner, but it must be made 
by the market not determined by a preset of opinions or 
conditions. In an environment where market must yield 
to government will, a flawed policy could make a lose-
lose situation: the government sanctioned technology 
may remain weak due to inherent technology or market 
weakness, while the other option is let to wither and may 
take a long time to recover. In this case, a policy set out to 
help one side may end up losing both. The better solution 
is to let both technologies compete and let the market 
be the judge. In a fair and open market, there is no such 
thing as a mainstream technology or minority technology; 
everything must pass market test by the law of “survival 
of the fittest”, not by government liking or a piece of 
paper (license).
(f) In order to prevent a policy from becoming self-
destructive, the government should keep clear of imposing 
any form of wishful thinking on operators and resist 
rushing to conclusion too soon based on extraneous 
factors. Since China is not a bona fide market economy, the 
government must act carefully not to make decisions for 
the industry without due process and consent from business 
leaders. One way to prevent such mistake is to bring in 
people with a balanced background who have in-depth 
knowledge of the industry, technology and market issues. 
Admittedly, change takes time and can be painful, but this 
is the path China must go down in history and the reward 
will be much greater than the country can reckon with. This 
is the best telecom regulators can do for the country.
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